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A B S T R A C T  
 
Many of us consider it uncontroversial that information processing is a natural function of the brain.  Since 
functions in biology are only won through empirical investigation, there should be a significant body of 
unambiguous evidence that supports this functional claim.  Before we can interpret the evidence, however, we 
must ask what it means for a biological system to process information.  Although a concept of information is 
generally accepted in the neurosciences without critique, in other biological sciences applications of information, 
despite careful analysis, remain controversial.  In this work I will review classical stimulus-response studies in 
neuroscience and use Claude Shannon’s mathematical information theory as a starting point to interpret 
information processing as a function of the brain.  I will illustrate a disanalogy between Shannon’s communication 
model (source, encode, channel, receiver, decode) and neural systems, and will argue that the neural code is not 
very code-like in comparison to genetic and engineered codes.  I suggest that we have conflated the act of 
representing neuroscientific facts—which we do to summarize and communicate our findings with others—with 
taking experimental facts to be representations.   
 





Many cognitive scientists and neuroscientists, and 
perhaps most people in general, believe that the brain 
processes information, although there is ambiguity 
about what this belief entails.  Bechtel and Richardson 
(2010), as philosophers of cognitive science, consider it 
uncontroversial that cognitive scientists involved in 
neuroimaging research believe that “the brain contains 
some regions that are specialized for processing 
specific types of information” (p. 241).  Neuroscientists 
too claim that “the principal function of the central 
nervous system is to represent and transform 
information” (deCharms & Zador 2000, p. 613).  Given 
such wide-spread acceptance of a belief, it is 
appropriate to ask for the justification of this belief.  If 
the justification is empirical and experimental, then we 
should look to the research reported by working 
scientists in the field; if it is primarily theoretical, then 
we should look to the arguments of philosophers and 
theoreticians. 
We will no doubt discover both kinds of justification 
if we look for it.  Yet we also assume that scientists, 
when stating that the brain processes information, are 
primarily stating an empirical fact or a widely agreed-
upon scientific proposition that is supported by a body 
of experimental evidence.  Like the physiologist who 
can back up the proposition ‘kidneys filter the blood’ 
with a presentation of the experimental evidence, we 
expect that the neuroscientist should be able to do the 
same regarding a functional claim about the brain.  I am 
not suggesting a definition of science or attempting to 
solve Popper’s demarcation problem, but am appealing 
to the belief that widely accepted scientific statements 
ought to be associated with unambiguous evidence.   
The task here, however, is somewhat more involved 
than an objective review of the scientific literature.  The 
concept of information processing, and informational 
language in general, has received considerable critique 
within the field of biology, with authors disagreeing 
about the explanatory and theoretical weight of 
informational concepts (Sarkar 1996; Maynard Smith 
2000; Godfrey-Smith 2000; Griffiths 2001).  It is, 
however, generally agreed that the concept of 
information developed by Claude Shannon as used in 
mathematical information theory can be appropriately 
applied to the biological sciences (Godfrey-Smith and 
Sterelny 2008).  Shannon’s concept of information can, 
in fact, be applied to anything that can be represented 
as a random variable (Cover & Thomas 2006).  Given 
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the broad applicability of Shannon information, it is 
helpful to further define the concept of carrying 
Shannon information. Objects are said to carry Shannon 
information about each other when the states of two or 
more objects are physically or causally correlated 
(Dretske 1981; Piccinini & Scarantino 2011).  
Scientists, however, in saying that the function of 
the brain is to process information must be saying more 
than this.  Smoke carries Shannon information about 
fire, for the presence or absence of fire and smoke are 
causally correlated, but certainly information 
processing in the brain means something more than 
causal correlation.  More, authorities claim that 
information processing is the function of the brain.  
Although smoke carries information about fire, most 
people would not claim that it is the function of smoke 
to do so. In this work I analyze a broad category of 
neuroscientific evidence to determine (1) if this 
evidence supports a richer concept of information 
processing than causal correlation, and (2) if this richer 
concept can unambiguously be called the function of the 
brain.  I will argue that this evidence does not support a 
richer concept of information in the neurosciences, and 
that the functional attribution is either empirically 
unjustified or too ambiguous for careful theoretical use.   
Cognitive scientific evidence, especially 
neuroimaging evidence, has been increasingly 
subjected to criticisms.  To better demarcate my 
position, I highlight that I am not specifically arguing 
between distributed versus localized processing in the 
brain (Utel 2001; Hardcastle & Stewart 2002; Bunzl et 
al. 2010), or pointing out the previously discussed 
technical-methodological limitations of brain assessing 
technologies (Logothetis 2008; Roskies 2007; Klein 
2009).  I do share with these authors the broader 
concern for interpretations of evidence in the field of 
cognitive science, and how theoretical assumptions 
influence interpretations of evidence, ultimately ending 
in statements made by researchers that carry the 
weight of scientific fact.  These facts, in turn, are used 
by naturalistic philosophers of mind to constrain 
philosophical theory and argument.  
 
2.  External-stimulus/brain-response studies and 
neuronal function 
     Although there are other categories of 
neuroscientific evidence, I will be focusing exclusively 
on external-stimulus/brain-response (ES/BR) studies 
as these experiments have been traditionally used to 
justify claims of information processing in the brain.  In 
ES/BR studies the experimenter systematically 
manipulates physical features of an organism’s external 
environment and measures temporally coincident 
properties of the organism’s brain.  The brain responses 
(BR) need not occur precisely simultaneous with the 
stimulus and are typically extended in time.  Brain 
responses in ES/BR studies are recorded using a variety 
of techniques based upon electromagnetic brain 
properties, including single-unit intra and extracellular 
recording, evoked potentials, EEG, MEG, fMRI, and 
others.  Edgar Adrian is generally credited with 
pioneering stimulus-response studies of nervous tissue.  
He was the first to record the electrical activity of single 
nerve fibers, the first to use the term information to 
describe neuronal activity (Garson 2003), and was 






2.1  Examination of the evidence 
 
     Adrian and Zotterman (1926), in their ground-
breaking ES/BR research, measured the electrical 
responses of single sensory stretch receptors while 
they were fixed to varying weights.  Adrian and 
Zotterman observed that a cell’s electrical responses 
are in the form of stereotyped action potentials, or 
spikes, and that the rate of producing spikes increases 
as the weight increases.  Thus the rate or frequency of 













Fig 1.  Schematic of a classic sigmoidal stimulus-
response curve.  The spike rate is a function of stimulus 
magnitude, allowing one to map spike rates onto 





magnitude of the stimulus.  Spike-rate can be plotted as 
a function of stimulus magnitude, demonstrating what 
is meant by a neural rate-code (Fig. 1).   
     These early experiments established that single cell 
responses and stimulus magnitudes may reliably 
covary with each other.  While magnitudes and 
intensities are important properties of stimuli, they are 
not the only properties of environmental stimuli that 
are relevant to an organism.  In general, a stimulus may 
be characterized by multiple properties.  For example, 
an auditory stimulus may be described by its intensity, 
frequency spectrum, temporal envelope, source 
direction, source distance, and so on.  It is possible that 
a particular cell responds to one of these properties and 
not to others, or to some combination of properties, 
which suggests that a cell may be selective for specific 
properties or features of the stimulus.      
     Barlow (1953) was perhaps the first to clearly 
demonstrate the feature selectivity of sensory cells 
(Reike et al. 1999).  By recording the electrical activity 
of retinal ganglion cells in the frog, he was able to show 
that the cell’s activity covaries with the location and 
size of a circular spot light on the retina.  After 
systematically varying the light spot’s size and location, 
Barlow determined that the cell’s receptive field—the 
collection of stimulus properties that maximally 
activated the cell—is a circularly symmetric form called 
a center-surround field.  Spots of light within a small 
region of the retina activate the cell, but spots of light 
away from that region inhibit it.   
     Hubel and Wiesel (1962) greatly extended Barlow’s 
work and discovered cells of the striate (visual) cortex 
that have surprisingly complicated receptive fields.  
Two of these cell types are the so-called simple and 
complex cells, which respond maximally to 
appropriately oriented bars or slits of light.  Some of the 
cells are relatively insensitive to the location of the bar, 
while others only appreciably respond to moving bars.  
In describing these cells, Hubel says that  
 
We feel that we have at least some 
understanding of a cell if we can say that its 
duty is to take care of a 1 degree by 1 degree 
region of retina, 6 degrees to the left of the 
fovea and 4 degrees above it, and to fire 
whenever a light line on a dark background 
appears, provided it is inclined at about 45 
degrees. (Hubel 1962, p. 168) 
      
     The evidence from these pioneering ES/BR electro-
physiological studies cannot be interpreted without the 
concept of selective response.   Selective response 
means, loosely, that the cell fires action potentials only 
when the ‘right’ stimulus is present.   Put more 
rigorously, selective response refers to two 
characteristics of neuronal cells: (1) the rate or pattern 
of firing action potentials (the spike train) covaries with 
specific stimulus properties, and (2) different cells may 
respond differently to the same stimulus.  Both 
characteristics are typically implied when referring to 
the selectivity of cells in ES/BR studies.  If someone 
discovered a neuron that exhibited (1), but on 
subsequent research discovered that all neurons 
exhibited (1) in the same way, one would not say that 
the initial neuron was selective for the stimulus, even 
though it exhibited selectivity for some stimuli among 
others.  As well, the fact that different neurons respond 
differently to similar stimuli does not imply (1), since 
neuronal responses may be random in response to 
stimuli.  Condition (1) is a form of within neuron 
stimulus selectivity, while condition (2) is a form of 
between neuron stimulus selectivity. For ES/BR studies 
such as Hubel and Wiesel’s, when an ES is chosen and 
controlled by the researcher,  we assume that the 
relation between the ES and BR is causal, as this 
assumption does not change our interpretation of 
selectivity, even though we use the term ‘covaries’  
which has statistical connotations. 
     We are now in a position to evaluate whether Hubel 
and Wiesel’s ground-breaking ES/BR studies justify the 
claim that the brain processes information in a way that 
means more than causal correlation.  The experimental 
evidence consists of recorded responses of complex 
cells that demonstrate stimulus selectivity in the senses 
of (1) and (2).  It seems that selectivity in the sense of 
(2) does not provide any justification that complex cells 
process information; the fact that different cells 
respond differently to the same stimulus suggests only 
that the cells are different in some way. 
     Claims of information processing, if they are justified 
by this experiment, must follow from the evidence that 
complex cell spike trains covary with the properties of 
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visual stimuli, or in causal language, that different 
visual stimuli cause different complex cell spike trains.  
Considering the latter causal language, the fact that 
different causes reliably produce different effects when 
mediated by the same cell does not appear to justify the 
claim that the cell processes information in a sense 
other than Shannon information.  Even so, this type of 
causal relationship appears everywhere one looks.  A 
particular pool ball when hit by other balls with 
different masses and velocities will undergo different 
effects.   The pool ball may not appreciably move when 
stimulated by light or sound at typical intensities.  The 
selectivity of the pool ball to acquire different velocities 
in response to different causal ‘stimuli’ does not appear 
fundamentally different than the selectivity of a 
complex cell, especially if the visual stimulus is taken to 
be a space-time collection of photons. 
     On closer analysis, there is a difference between the 
causality in the pool ball example and the relation 
between the ES and BR of complex cells.   The pool ball 
example involves direct physical contact and an 
exchange of energy and momentum, while the causal 
response of the complex cell is more indirect.  Photons 
travel through the lens of the eye and are absorbed by 
photoreceptor cells of the retina.  Absorption of 
photons modulates the release of the neurotransmitter 
glutamate at synapses onto so-called bipolar cells, 
causing the electrical field across the membrane of 
these cells to become more positive or negative, which 
respectively increases or decreases the probability of 
generating an action potential.  Bipolar cells have axons 
that synapse on other cells, and through a series of 
neuronal connections, influence the membrane 
potential of complex cells and subsequent action 
potential generation.  The causal chain from photons to 
complex cell response is complicated and likely 
includes causal feedback, yet it is not obvious that a 
complicated causal chain is necessarily information 
processing.   
      Even more worrisome is the fact that selective 
causation need not imply that the BR has any functional 
relation to the ES at all.  Nothing rules out the 
possibility that those selective correlations are 
accidental—not in the sense that the correlations are 
statistically spurious, but that those correlations are 
functionally irrelevant to the stimuli of interest.  As an 
analogy, suppose my computer has a CPU fan with a 
blue LED light on the fan.  The light, however, is unlit 
and the fan isn’t spinning.  It happens that when I kick 
my computer just so on the left side of the front cover, 
the LED lights up, the fan begins spinning but stops 
after a second or two, and the light goes out.  If I kick it 
again, just so, it starts up for a second then stops.  I can 
reliably cause the fan to turn on for a bit.  When I kick 
the computer in other places, or shake it up, or sing to 
it, nothing happens to the fan.  The fan is selectively 
correlated with a specific kick.  Perhaps there are 
hundreds of computers, constructed at the same 
factory, that behave similarly.  This selective, causal, 
complex, and perhaps arbitrary relationship does not 
imply that the fan is functionally relevant to my kicking, 
or processes kicking information, or represents 
kicking—the relationship may be accidental.    
 
2.2  Functional claims 
 
     Intuitively, there appears to be a qualitative 
difference between the computer fan example and 
neurons like center-surround ganglion cells.  The 
correlation between light-rays and the firing of ganglion 
cells is beneficial to the organism in some way, while 
the correlation between kicking the computer and the 
spinning fan is not beneficial to the computer—but this 
first hint at a difference is not convincing.  If my 
computer fan is not spinning, and the CPU is rapidly 
heating up which may cause the computer to crash, 
then the correlation will be quite beneficial if I start 
kicking my computer.  
     We must look elsewhere to explain the difference 
between the two cases, and this search leads one to 
consider fundamental issues in biology concerning 
purpose, function, and design.  The computer was not 
designed (by an engineering team) to manifest a 
correlation between kicking and fan movement, while 
the organism was designed (through natural selection 
or else wise) to have ganglion cells whose activity 
covaries with patterns of light rays.  It is highly 
controversial whether artificial design and natural 
selection can be grouped into a univocal concept of 
design to support the above intuition, although some 
authors clearly make use of a broad notion of design to 
do so (Kitcher 1993). 
     We would like to say that it is the function of 
ganglion cells to produce activity that correlates with 
light rays, and it is not the function of the fan to 




accident.  Once we proffer this explanation, we must 
acknowledge that selective correlation, by itself, is not 
sufficient to establish the existence of a function, 
information processing or otherwise.  This finding is no 
surprise to philosophers of biology who have 
investigated the concept of biological function over the 
past fifty years, but it reminds us of the limitations in 
arguing that it is the function of the brain (or neurons) 
to process information based upon the discovery of 
selective correlations between stimuli and neuronal 
activity.  
     Philosophers of biology have understood biological 
functions in numerous ways, but two formulations are 
prominent, one grossly characterized as ‘backward-
looking’ and the other as ‘forward-looking’.  The 
backward looking or ‘etiological’ concept roughly 
defines a function of a given trait in terms of the trait’s 
causal history of effects (Wright 1973; Millikan 1984; 
Neander 1991).  It is often called the selected effect 
concept of function because it takes biological functions 
to be (historically) casual consequences that were 
preserved via natural selection.   The forward looking 
concept, in contrast, defines a function of a trait in 
terms of its causal dispositions or capacities, where the 
relevant capacities are often taken to advance some 
goal or purpose of the organism (Rudwick 1964; 
Bigelow and Pargetter 1987), although Cummins 
(1975) proposed a dispositional theory without direct 
reference to purpose that is perhaps most acceptable to 
practicing scientists (Amundson and Lauder 1994). 
Roughly, Cummins’ theory of function, often called a 
causal role theory, involves relating the causal 
capacities of parts of a system to other capacities of the 
whole system.  A part-wise capacity that contributes to 
a capacity of the whole is said to be a function of that 
part. 
     When experimental neuroscientists like Hubel and 
Wiesel identify selective correlations between light 
patterns and ganglion activity, what additional 
observations or assumptions allow them to claim that 
the function of ganglion cells is to produce activity that 
correlates with the presence and absence of light 
patterns?  Selective correlation is not enough to 
establish function, and it does not seem that 
experimental neuroscientists need appeal to natural 
selection in order to justify functional claims.  Scientists 
identify or at least speculate on function by 
investigating the systems of interest in the lab, thereby 
explicating causal mechanisms that, for instance, make 
vision possible.  We presume that the correlation 
between light patterns and ganglion activity 
contributes to the capacity of the organism to see—the 
correlation plays a causal role in vision—whereas the 
correlation between kicking and the spinning fan is not 
connected to any (relevant) capacity of the computer. 
     Correlation, however, is not the end of the story and 
is not a particularly useful identification of function.  
Many biological variables correlate, both within the 
organism and with the environment.  Heart rate and the 
speed of ambulatory locomotion in humans covaries, 
but it would be a odd to say that it is the function of the 
heart to produce contraction rates that correlate with 
the speed of movement.   When we attribute the 
function of information processing to neurons, we 
appear to be attributing something more than 
correlation or selective causal response.  But to infer 
information processing from an experimentally 
observed ES/BR correlation, we must first assume that 
the correlation is not accidental in the sense above.  A 
correlation can be said to be non-accidental if the 
organism was designed to manifest that correlation, if it 
was maintained by a selection process, or if the 
correlation is functional in the sense that the 
correlation contributes to some relevant capacity of the 
organism.  The latter notion of a non-accidental 
correlation is perhaps the least controversial among 
practicing experimental neuroscientists, but if we use 
this understanding to support claims of information 
processing, then information processing, with respect 
to ganglion cells, simply means a correlation between 
the ES and BR that contributes to the capacity for 
vision.   
     The lack of richness in this functional claim, based 
upon the evidence, does not significantly depend upon a 
causal role theory of function.  If one wishes to apply a 
selected effect notion of function to neuroscience data 
like in Garson (2011), then we can say that the brain 
structure was selected (by a neural selective process) to 
manifest a correlation between the ES and BR.  Neither 
notion of function appears to transform the empirical 
correlation into a theoretically useful concept of 
information processing. 
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3. Justification of information processing from 
ES/BR studies 
 
     There is a strong tendency to associate information 
processing with the results of ES/BR experiments like 
Hubel-Weisel’s.  The spike trains of neurons appear to 
be relaying specific messages about the external 
environment to the organism.  Claude Shannon (1948), 
the founder of mathematical communication theory, 
rigorously defined a model of information transfer that 
may explain this appearance.  In Shannon’s language, 
the physical environment acts as a source that 
generates a message (ES), the message is transformed 
by an encoder—a sensory organ of the organism—into 
a signal suitable for biological transmission.  The spike 
train (BR) is assumed to be this signal and the neuron 
to be the transmission channel.   These comparisons are 
reasonable, but the next stage of the communication 
model, however, is problematic (see Fig. 2).   
Communication requires a receiver that performs the 
inverse operation of the transmitter, or something that 
reconstructs the environmental message from the spike 
train signal. 
     The experimental researcher, the one who discovers 
selective correlations between neuronal spike trains 
and environmental messages (stimuli), often plays the 
surrogate role of the receiver or decoder.  By describing 
relational or mathematical mappings between the ES 
and BR, neuroscientists attempt to ‘read the neural 
code.’  But this is not the sort of information 
transmission we were trying to explain.  To complete 
the biological communication model, and to ground 
information transfer, we need to explain how the 
organism can reconstruct the environmental message 
from its temporal pattern of action potentials, and we 
must demonstrate that the organism reproduces a 
similar environmental message within the organism 
itself.   The neuronal spike train is not the message—if 
anything it is the transmission signal or encoded 
message.   Although interesting, it is not enough to 
show that spike trains have the capacity to represent 
environmental messages through selective covariation.  
The fact that researchers can mathematically map spike 
trains back onto stimuli does not say anything about 
how the organism biologically reconstructs the 
environmental message.  This capacity to map follows 
immediately from statistical correlations.  
Neuroscientists who acknowledge these limitations 
explain that mathematically reconstructing stimuli from 
spike trains requires taking the homunculus point of 
view (Reike et al. 1999). 
     For an organism to receive an environmental 
message in Shannon’s sense, that message must be 
within the organism and have the same structure as the 
original message.  This suggestion may appear radical, 
but it is simply the completion of Shannon’s 
communication model—the same model that supports 
the intuition that the brain processes and transmits 
information.  For example, consider telephonic 
communication.  Air pressure waves may be converted 
into analog electronic messages that are encoded into 
spike trains 
encode decode 
No causal or biological basis Causal and biological  
∑ H(t - ti ) 
estimated stimulus ŝ(t) physical stimulus s(t) 
Fig 2.  The typical encoding-decoding relation used in the neurosciences.  Physical stimuli are encoded 
into spike trains through a causal, biological process.  Spike trains are decoded into estimates of stimuli 





digital signals and transmitted through a physical 
channel.  This digital signal, which does not mirror the 
sound wave in form, reaches a destination where it is 
reconstructed back into an analog message that drives a 
loudspeaker, reproducing the original pressure wave.  If 
the original message was not reproduced (perhaps 
imperfectly) at a destination, we could not claim that 
communication or information transfer took place.  A 
message is communicated if and only if that message is 
reproduced at the receiver. 
     If one assumes that the organism receives 
environmental messages, then in accordance with 
Shannon’s communication model, at least the structure 
of that message must be physically reproduced within 
the organism.  The alleged encoded message—or spike 
train—has a physical basis, thus the message ought to 
have a physical basis as well.  This means that the 
scientist would have to demonstrate a set of brain-
related physical measurements that copy, perhaps 
imperfectly, the structure of an environmental stimulus.  
Let us call this the brain-image of an environmental 
message.   It would remain for the scientist to describe 
the mechanisms by which neuronal spike trains 
causally reconstruct the brain-image of a particular 
environmental message. 
     When decoding spike trains in practice, the 
neuroscientist leaves the animal lab and goes to work at 
the computer. On the computer, spike trains and 
environmental stimuli are given numerical 
representations.  The creative work involves finding 
mathematical algorithms and heuristics—let us call 
these the decoding procedures—that link spike trains 
to stimuli.  When the neuroscientist finds a decoding 
procedure that works, she claims to have discovered a 
neural code.  The problem is that the neurons 
themselves have no physical relation to the decoding 
procedure.  The actual neurons and spike trains in the 
living organism do not reconstruct environmental 
stimuli within the organism using these fabricated 
decoding procedures, or at least the neuroscientist has 
no evidence of this.  If she supposes that other neurons 
have the function of performing the decoding 
procedures that she discovered, and she wishes to find 
biological evidence, then she must record from neurons 
that allegedly perform the decode, and, using similar 
mathematical techniques above, fabricate a secondary 
decoding procedure that links these spike trains to the 
original decoding procedures.  These investigations 
lead to an infinite experimental regress that mirrors the 
epistemological regress of the homunculus argument.  
The only way to stop the regress is to discover the 
brain-image of the stimulus. 
     Eliasmith and Anderson (2002) have suggested 
another way to address this experimental regress when 
considering mathematically fabricated decoding 
procedures used in neuroscience, but their solution is 
quite similar to sweeping the problem under the rug: 
      
In fact, according to our account, there is no 
directly observable counterpart to these 
optimal decoders. Rather, the decoders are 
‘embedded’ in the synaptic weights between 
neighboring neurons. That is, coupling weights 
of neighboring neurons indirectly reflect a 
particular population decoder, but they are not 
identical to the population decoder, nor can the 
decoder be unequivocally ‘read-off’ of the 
weights. (quotes in original, p. 17) 
 
     So long as one can construct a mathematical heuristic 
to statistically map neuronal activity onto stimuli—
which we can always do if the activity is correlated in 
some way, and becomes more likely if we consider a 
population of neurons—then we should also assume 
that the mathematical heuristic is unobservably 
‘embedded’ within synapses.  This concept of 
embeddedness is even more mysterious than 
representation in that we cannot, even in theory, 
consistently map synaptic weights to the mathematical 
decoder.  We can avoid the regress, but at the expense 
of an unfalsifiable and seemingly unscientific 
assumption.   
      Application of Shannon’s model to neuroscience 
appears to require embedded decoders and embedded 
brain-images, both of which are beyond empirical 
investigation, so the very presence of an encoded 
message within the brain presents a problem.  In other 
words, why should the brain contain encoded messages 
that transmit environmental messages, yet never 
reproduce the structure of the message itself?   The 
organism requires the actual message, and not only an 
encoded version of it.  At this point our analogy to 
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Shannon’s communication model breaks down.  It does 
not appear that the environment communicates a 
message to the organism, but rather, the organism is 
perhaps translating the environment.  Spike trains are 
not signals corresponding to encoded messages; they 
are the actual messages only in the language of the 
organism, whatever that might mean.  With respect to 
the organism, the message is not encoded in anyway, 
and speaking of a neural code is metaphorical and at 
times misleading.  The analogy has changed from 
information transmission to language translation.  But 
even the idea that spike trains are a language is 
metaphorical—spikes trains need not constitute a 
private biological language.  Our goal here, however, is 
not to support other metaphors, but to show that 
Shannon’s communication model, which is an integral 
part of modern technology, does not match the way in 
which the environment ‘communicates’ with the 
organism. 
  
4.  The neural code 
 
     It is assumed in the neurosciences that there exists 
something called a neural code, and that this code has 
something to do with how the brain represents physical 
properties (and mental properties if you believe in such 
things).   One reason for this informational code talk is 
the assumed straightforward analogy between the 
action potentials of neural systems and the classical 
communication model of source, encoder, channel, 
decoder, and receiver (Bergstrom and Rosvall 2009), 
but this analogy is incomplete and generates 
ambiguities.  The decoder and receiver in the model 
have nothing to do with the organism, but it is the 
organism that allegedly decodes and receives the 
message. 
     The first stage of encoding, in which the properties of 
an ES are supposedly encoded into patterns of action 
potential, is probably the least controversial, but on 
what ground can we call this a code in more than a 
statistical sense?  Compare this code to the genetic 
code.  It is generally agreed that genes code for the 
amino acid sequences of proteins.  The two alphabets of 
the genetic code are finite and well-defined, consisting 
of the four-letter set of nucleic acid bases (A, G, T, C) 
and the 23 amino acids plus a stop codon. There is a 
regular mapping between nucleic acid bases and amino 
acids, where ordered sequences of bases map to 
sequences of amino acids.  The mapping is one-way in 
that transcription and translation decode base 
sequences into proteins, but there is no cellular 
mechanism that encodes proteins as sequences of 
bases.  We might call this an ‘encodeless’ code.  Still, 
even authors skeptical of informational talk in biology 
see reason to call the genetic code a code in a way that 
means more than causal correlation (Godfrey-Smith 
2000; Griffiths 2001). 
     The two alphabets of the neural code are taken to be 
environmental physical properties and temporal 
patterns of neuronal activity. Both alphabets are 
presumably uncountably infinite because both concern 
continuous variables, although one can make the case 
that perception is not infinitely fine-grained and that 
continuous magnitudes are discretized.  While infinite 
codes exist and neuroscientists have demonstrated how 
neuronal activity can be used to estimate continuous 
parameters of a stimulus, it remains difficult to clearly 
specify the alphabets of the neural code (Eliasmith and 
Anderson 2002), especially in comparison to the 
genetic code—which strangely has taken more criticism 
with respect to informational talk than neural coding.  
     With regard to neural coding and the nature of the 
code’s alphabet, photoreceptors, the first stage or input 
element of the visual system, bring up several 
questions.  Photoreceptors clearly play an important 
role in our capacity for vision.  Photons from the 
environment are absorbed by light-sensitive 
photopigments of the photoreceptor, which through a 
cascade of biochemical reactions, hyperpolarize the 
photoreceptor, decreasing the rate of glutamate release 
from the photoreceptor synapse.  The rate of glutamate 
release is thus graded from its highest rate in complete 
darkness to lower rates with increasing light 
absorption and hyperpolarization.  Post-synaptic 
bipolar cells respond to these glutamate levels by 
generating action potentials. 
     Should we conclude that the photoreceptor 
processes code-like information, or is it simply part of a 
well-specified causal cascade going from photon 
absorption to glutamate release?  Although we can 
always talk as if the photoreceptor is processing 
information—in the statistical, correlation sense—we 
are less drawn to do so, presumably because the 
mechanistic details of the photoreceptor are fairly-well 
understood.  Either the photoreceptor is processing 




processing talk tends to drop out once we sufficiently 
understand the causal mechanism, or it is not 
processing information, requiring us to explain why 
ganglion cells process information but photoreceptors 
do not.  Neuroscientists have tried to cash-out this 
difference through the dichotomy of implicit versus 
explicit representations, but implicit here simply means 
that a successful mathematical decoding heuristic has 
not yet been devised by the scientist (deCharms and 
Zador 2000), making the distinction relative. 
     Next consider glutamate release at the photoreceptor 
synapse.  The rate of glutamate release, when looking at 
the complete population of photoreceptors, appears to 
encode everything we need to know about the external 
visual stimulus.  In other words, if we were able to 
measure the rate of glutamate release at every 
photoreceptor, then a clever neuroscientist would be 
able to reconstruct, or decode, the stimulus that led to 
that particular pattern of glutamate release.  The 
photoreceptor is the encoder, but it encodes physical 
properties into rates of glutamate release.  Those 
knowledgeable about Shannon information theory will 
even tell us that the downstream electrical activity 
resulting from the glutamate release can only degrade 
the information in the source signal via the so-called 
data processing inequality.  It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that the population-rate of glutamate release 
is an appropriate alphabet of the visual neural code, a 
code that has nothing to do with action potentials. 
     In addition to ambiguities in specifying the alphabets 
of the neural code, there are problems with the 
‘grammar’ of neural coding.  An important aspect of all 
engineered codes is that concatenated sequences or 
combinations of the ‘source’ alphabet can be recovered 
as sequences or combinations of the ‘target’ alphabet.  
This combinatorial property is manifest in the genetic 
code: sequences of bases are systematical mapped to 
sequences of amino acids.  Do neural codes, at least the 
ones discovered by neuroscientists, unambiguously 
manifest this property?  I will first concede that 
neuroscientists have demonstrated that temporal 
sequences of action potentials can be recovered as 
temporal sequences of distinct stimuli.  My concern, 
however, is that neuroscientists have not demonstrated 
that multiple contemporaneous source messages are 
encoded by any obvious function of the individual 
message encoding schemes.  To be clearer, if S1, S2, and 
S3 are stimuli and R1, R2, and R3 are spike trains, then 
given individual encoding relations S1R1, S2R2, 
and S3R3; does S1+S2+S3R1+R2+R3, where 
S1S2S3 occur contemporaneously? 
     This situation is particular relevant to vision and 
how neuroscientists understand the receptive fields of 
cortical cells like those discovered by Hubel and Wiesel.  
Individual cells, such as complex cells, are classically 
characterized by their receptive fields and typically fire 
most when the stimulus is a suitably oriented bar.  This 
leads us to believe there is a clear encoding relation 
between oriented bars and cellular responses that is 
always followed, but experiments like those of Bakin et 
al. (2000) show us that this is simply not the case.  In 
Fig. 3, the dashed-boxes below the x-axis represent the 
identified receptive field of a striate cortical neuron, 
and the bar within the dashed-box in the S1 column 
represents a bar in the preferred orientation for that 
neuron.  S1 is the ‘optimal’ stimulus for this neuron, and 
we see for S2 that a bar outside of the receptive field 
generates little response.  However, the simultaneous 
presentation of S1 and S2 yields a super-optimal 
response, even though we might expect S2 to not 
influence the response at all (because it is outside of the 
classical receptive field).  In symbols, S1R1 and 
S2R2, but S3=S1+S2 does not map to any obvious 
linear function of R1 and R2.   
     We can appreciate this potential difficulty in neural 
coding when we consider again the classical stimulus-
response curve Fig. 1 as a function R(S), where R is the 
neural response and S the stimulus.  Now consider a 
response function R(S1, S2) for the same neuron.  When 
each stimulus S1 and S2 is a visual stimulus, R(S1, S2) ≠ 
R(S1)+R(S2) for some stimuli as above.  Since R(S1, S2) 
is not linearly separable, nor obviously separable by 
some other transformation, then to understand the 
encoding relation R(S1, S2), we must experimentally 
determine this relation by probing the neuron with a 
wide range of joint stimuli S1+S2.  A similar procedure 
is required to determine R(S1, S2, S3) and so forth, 
procedures that quickly become impractical for 
moderate numbers of stimuli, yet if the piecewise 
encoding relations do not clearly determine 
combinatorial relations, then in what sense is the 
piecewise code a code in the first place?  Scientists may 
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use nonlinear mathematical techniques to patch 
together piecewise encoding relations into 
combinatorial relations, but then, as in the previous 
section, one may question the biological relevance of 
such a practice. 
     As well as lacking contemporaneous combinatorial 
properties, responses of neurons in primary and 
extrastriate cortex are not strictly determined by the 
passive physical properties of external stimuli, but are 
dependent upon the behavioral and cognitive states of 
the organism (Pasternak et al. 2003).  These sorts of 
dependencies are not present in the genetic code—at 
least not unless one stretches code-like talk beyond the 
coding of proteins and onto whole-organism 
phenotypes, which does not appear appropriate 
(Godfrey-Smith 2000; Griffiths 2001).  One might argue 
that behavioral dependences are ‘part of the code’, 
making the encoding relation look something like (S, 
B)R where B is a behavioral or cognitive state, but 
this move greatly complicates any understanding of the 
alphabet and grammar of the neural code.  What 
behaviors or cognitive states count in the code? How do 
we specify the relevant alphabet? Do (S, B) pairs have 
combinatorial properties, are not behaviors functions of 
neural responses, and will mappings not change with 
time and learning?  Again, one can respond that “it’s 
complicated, but this is what takes to understand the 
neural code”, yet this code looks less and less like a 
systematic code and more like an unruly temporally 
dependent multidimensional blob of lawless 
correlations.  
     Neural coding, as practiced by cognitive scientists 
and neuroscientists, is an anything-goes sort of coding, 
by which I mean that any brain properties that 
correlate with stimulus properties, behavioral 
properties, cognitive properties, or social contexts can 
be considered part of the code.  This is not a 
shortcoming or limitation of neuroscientific research, 
but it is a limitation of the coding metaphor.  The code 
of the neural code does not have a lot going for it when 
critically compared to genetic or engineered codes.  One 
property they probably share is that their respective 
mapping relations are arbitrary.  Garson (2003) has 
attempted to defend a concept of information as 
applied to neural responses based upon this property.  
Given the above shortcomings of neural coding, it is 
difficult to see how arbitrariness by itself justifies 
informational and code-like language. 
 
5.  Information theory as a tool 
 
     The decoding procedures discovered by 
neuroscientists are useful in that they allow us to 
predict spike trains given environmental stimuli, and 
stimuli given spike trains; but the specific decoding 
procedures do not tell us anything about the function of 
neuronal populations—because the decoding 
algorithms have nothing to do with the biology of the 
organism.  Rather, the capacity to successfully predict 
between stimuli and spike trains via decoding is 
typically taken as evidence that spike trains represent 


















S1 S2 S3 
Fig 3.  Response of a neuron in the primary visual cortex.  
Dashed boxes represent the receptive field of the neuron.  A 
bar in the middle of the dashed-box is the optimal stimulus for 
the neuron, while a bar outside of the box is a stimulus that 
does not activate the neuron.  The combination of a bar 
inside and outside of the receptive field produces a super-
optimal response, which is not predicted by either stimulus 





follows from the statistical correlations between spike 
trains and stimuli. 
     There are neuroscientists who consistently, and with 
clearly stated assumptions, apply Shannon’s 
mathematical information theory to neuronal data with 
the goal of quantifying the theoretical channel capacity, 
or bit rate, of spike trains (Strong et al. 1998; Reike et 
al. 1999). These interesting applications of information 
theory within neuroscience try to answer the following 
question: assuming spike trains carry Shannon 
information about the environment, how much 
information (in bits) could they carry?  We could ask 
similar questions about the oxygen molecules in one’s 
living room, the ants in an anthill, or the blades of grass 
in one’s yard—although the answers presumably would 
not be as interesting.  The fact that Shannon 
information theory can be rigorously applied to spike 
trains does not imply that the brain processes 
information as a function. 
     Other neuroscientists, such as deCharms and Zador 
(2000), repeatedly claim that spike trains carry 
information about the environment as a fact, and 
suggest what it means to carry information: “Imagine 
recording from the neuron labeled B1 during different 
types of stimuli or behaviors and discovering the 
information that this neuron carries about the 
organism’s environment—the content of this neuron’s 
signal” (p. 614-15).  In a concrete example about a 
retinal cell they say that “The activity of the neuron will 
be highly correlated with the point of luminance (thus 
carrying content about this input)” (p. 637).  Like in 
Hubel-Wiesel’s ES/BR experiments, we call this 
evidence the selective covariation between stimulus 
properties and spike trains.   deCharms and Zador use 
the word ‘information’ above to possibly mean ‘specific 
properties or features of the stimulus.’   Given these 
examples, we can suppose that they would endorse the 
following argument: (1) spikes trains and stimulus 
properties selectively (and causally) covary, and (2) the 
(representational) content of a spike train is the 
stimulus property that causes that spike train. 
     deCharms and Zador do not bring forth any other 
types of experimental evidence other than selective 
covariation to justify the claim that spike trains carry 
informational or representational content, although 
they do stress that the representational nature of spikes 
trains is based upon content and function.  We have 
argued that (1) is a statement about the evidence that 
all of us would agree upon, but that (2) does not 
obviously follow.   The fact that an ES and BR selectively 
covary, through causal paths, does not appear sufficient 
to justify claims of representational content, and it has 
been argued that covariation of this sort is not even 
necessary for representational content (Millikan 1989; 
Bechtel 1998).  
     We need not expect deCharms and Zador, as 
neuroscientists, to philosophically justify what it means 
for a spike train to carry representational content, yet if 
claims of carrying content do not follow immediately 
from the observed evidence, then we can only assume 
that they are interpreting the evidence or 
communicating the evidence by way of metaphor.  But 
deCharms and Zador, along with many other 
neuroscientists, speak as though ‘carrying content’ is a 
straightforward experimental fact apart from, or in 
addition to, selective correlations. 
     To justify informational talk, some neuroscientists 
mount a proof-is-in-the-pudding defense, arguing that 
the use of informational concepts has helped the field of 
neuroscience progress.  How else could visual 
neuroscience be where it is now without envisioning 
hierarchies of different layers of neurons that process 
specific types of information?   I believe confusion 
arises between representations of experimental facts—
which we use to summarize and share our findings with 
others—and taking experimental facts to be 
representations.  For example, there is a tendency to 
imagine that a receptive field (or stimulus-response 
tuning curve, e.g. Fig. 1) is a property of a neuron, but 
this is no straightforward intrinsic physical property of 
a cell. If anything a receptive field is a mathematical 
function of physical properties spread throughout the 
brain and includes, from the start, reference to external 
stimuli.  When a receptive field is first characterized, it 
simply represents the collection of stimulus-response 
pairs (in the form of a handy graph or picture) that 
were investigated by the researcher.  The receptive 
field summarizes the results of an experiment involving 
a particular neuron; it is not an intrinsic physical or 
biological property of that neuron. 
     These representations of experimental facts are 
undoubtedly useful in guiding further research and 
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generating hypotheses.  Neuroscientists can and do 
reason using these representations, but this does not 
imply that, for instance, spike trains carry 
representational content.  Similarly, Shannon 
information theory can be usefully applied to neuronal 
responses, but that does not imply that neuronal 
responses are code-like or process information, at least 
no more so than any objects that manifest causal 
correlations.  We appear to be confusing the tools we 
use to understand neural systems with the properties 
of neural systems.   An appreciation of this distinction 
may help us to better understand the function of 
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